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ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACKWARD -
GOODWILL AS A DISTRIBUTABLE ASSET OF A LAW
PARTNERSHIP
"A lawyer's clients are neither chattel nor merchandise."' For years, that
succinct statement was the reason that prohibited goodwill as an asset of a law
partnership. Traditionally, the law regarded the goodwill of a business partner-
ship as property, but it did not extend the same benefit to professional partner-
ships.' However, the courts have gradually expanded goodwill as an asset.
After initially recognizing goodwill in business partnerships, the courts then
found that goodwill could attach to professional partnerships, and even to law
partnerships, in limited circumstances.3 But, the courts did not expand good-
will to include being a distributable asset of a law partnership.'
The law's reluctance to find goodwill as a distributable asset in profes-
sional and law partnerships stemmed, in part, from the very nature of goodwill
itself. "Goodwill is a hope founded upon probability."' The goodwill of a
business partnership was considered to be every advantage that the business
had acquired which caused people to patronize the firm because of its
favorable reputation.6  By describing goodwill as a "hope" or "every
advantage," goodwill was considered to be the "most intangible" of intangible
property.' This intangible asset could attach to a business partnership because
the chief elements of the value of business goodwill were continuity of place
and continuity of name.8 For most businesses, the value of a location or name
'Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J.Super. 343, 346, 336 A.2d 498, 499 (1975); Folly Farms I, Inc. v. Trustees, 282
Md.659, 676, 387 A.2d 248, 256 (1978).
'Compare Brass & Iron Works Co. v. Payne, 33 N.E. 88, 89 (1893) (Business goodwill is property); Smith v.
Posner, 85 Misc. 2d 934, 935-36, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 197, 198 (1975). "Goodwill in a professional partnership] is
an intangible reflection of confidence in the particular individual."; 13 OJuR. 3d. Business Relationships §
955 (1979).
'Courts recognized measurable goodwill as a business asset in Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22
(1875); Morgan v. Perhamus, 26 Ohio St. 517 (188 1); (Professional partnerships were recognized as posses-
sing goodwill). See. e.g.. Evans v. Gunnip, 36 Dei.Ch. 589, 135 A.2d 128 (1957) (certified public accoun-
tants); Stefanski v. Gonnella, 15 Mass. App. 500, 446 N.E.2d 734 (1983) (accountants); Durio v. Johnson, 68
N.M. 82, 358 P.2d 703 (1961) (veterinarians); Fine v. Laband, 35 Wash. App. 368, 667 P.2d 101 (1983)
(physicians). Law partnership goodwill was measured for divorce settlements and tax purposes. See, e.g..
Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d
374 (1978).
'See, e.g., Siddall v. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1959), affd, 7 N.Y.2d 846, 196 N.Y.S.2d
986 (1959). Smith v. Posner, 85 Misc. 2d 934, 380 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1975); Cohen v. Biernoff, 84 App. Div. 2d
802, 444 N.Y.S.2d (1981).
'Hart v. Smith, 159 Ind. 182, 64 N.E. 661 (1902).
'13 O.JuR. 3d Business Relationships § 955 (1979). "Goodwill is a reasonable expectancy of preference in the
race of competition derived from succession in place, name, or otherwise to a business that has won the
favor of its customers. In re Brown, 242 N.Y. I, 150 N.E. 581 (1926).
'Goodwill is intangible because it is essentially reputation that will generate business in the future. Dugan v.
Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 429, 457 A.2d I, 3 (1983). Goodwill has an intangible nature and has no existence ex-
cept in connection with a continuing business. Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F. 2d 626, 629 cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1926).
'Brown. 242 N.Y. at 7. 150 N.E. at 583.
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could be determined. However, professional partnerships and law partnerships
were not considered to have the "continuity of place and name" that business
partnerships possessed. The courts felt that since law and professional partner-
ships depended on the individual skill and learning of each partner, goodwill
was a personal asset and could not attach to the partnership.'
The Supreme Court of Ohio was first presented with the issue of whether
goodwill could be included as an asset upon the dissolution of a law partner-
ship in Spayd v. Turner, Granzow and Hollenkamp. 10
On April 15, 1977, Attorney Spayd and the other parties to the lawsuit
entered into a written partnership agreement." This partnership for the
general practice of law existed until April 25, 1978.12 At that time, Spayd decid-
ed to withdraw from the firm because of "philosophical differences" with the
other partners. 3 On March 26, 1979, Spayd presented a counter-proposal in
response to the firm's proposal for his separation compensation.' Spayd's
counter-proposal included payment for a share of the firm's goodwill) 5 When
no agreement was reached, Spayd commenced action against the firm, alleging
that he had been "wrongfully expelled" and asked for an appraisal of the part-
nership's tangible and intangible assets. 6 The trial court ruled that it was "im-
permissible and unethical" to include goodwill as an element of the law part-
nership's assets. 7 The court of appeals agreed that goodwill could not be
distributed upon the dissolution of a law partnership. 8 Spayd appealed to the
Ohio Supreme Court. He contended that the law firm did have a measurable
element of goodwill and that ethical considerations did not prevent an account-
ing for this goodwill upon the partnership's dissolution.
The Ohio Supreme Court examined both the traditional and modern
views of goodwill as an asset in a law partnership and held that it was not
against public policy to include measurable goodwill as an asset upon the disso-
lution of a law partnership. 9 The court also concluded that ethical considera-
'Cook v. Lauten, 1 11. App. 2d 255, 260, 117 N.E.2d 414, 416 (1954); Masters v. Brooks, 132 App. Div. 874,
117 N.Y.S. 585 (1909).
"119 Ohio St. 3d 55, 482 N.E.2d 1232 (1985).
"Id. at 55, 482 N.E.2d at 1233.
"
1 d. at 57, 482 N.E.2d at 1234.
13Id.
"Id. at 58, 482 N.E.2d at 1235.
"5d.
1Id.
"Id. Spayd brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.
"Id. Spayd appealed to the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County.
"Id. at 57, 482 N.E.2d at 1238. The court also looked to the general principles of Ohio Revised Code § 1775
and the Uniform Partnership Act.
At the outset, it is beneficial to set forth a number of general principles emanating from R.C. Chapter
1775, the Uniform Partnership Law, which are applicable to this case in controversy. It is of utmost
importance to be reminded that the respective rights of partnership members depend primarily on the
specific provisions contained within the partnership contract. This concept is recognized in R.C.
[Vol. 20:1
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tions did not preclude finding goodwill in a law partnership. 0 However, the
court held that goodwill could be distributed upon the dissolution of the part-
nership only when it was specifically provided for in the partnership agree-
ment.2 This paper will examine the Spayd court's findings and the reasoning
that led Ohio to expand the concept of goodwill in law and professional part-
nerships.
I. THE DEFINITION OF GOODWILL
"Undoubtedly, goodwill is valuable, but it is difficult to decide accurately
what is included in the term." 2 Simply stated, goodwill is the probability that
"old customers will resort to the old place."23 Even stated simply, goodwill may
be "a word of which very few people understand the meaning."" Justice Car-
dozo amplified this traditional definition by stating, "Men will pay for any
privilege that gives a reasonable expectancy of preference in the race of com-
petition. Such expectancy may come from succession in place or name or
otherwise to a business that has won the favor of its customers. It is then
known as goodwill."2 By 1891, it was "well settled" that goodwill was legally
considered to be property.26 The courts recognized that goodwill could inhere
in the real property of the business because old customers would be attracted
1775.17 wherein the rights and duties of partners in relation to the partnership are specifically set
forth "subject to any agreement between them."
Furthermore, all property originally brought into the partnership or subsequently acquired is de-
fined as partnership property. R.C. 1775.07(A). The only property rights vested in a partner are his
rights in specific partnership property, his interest in the partnership, and his right to participate in the
management. R.C. 1775.23. The partner's interest in the partnership is limited to his share of the prof-
its and surplus. R.C. 1775.25.
The dissolution of a partnership, as distinguished from winding up the business, denotes the change
in the relation of the partners caused by any partner's discontinued association with the ongoing
business. R.C. 1775.28. Pursuant to R.C. 1775.2 1, a partner is thereby entitled to a formal accounting
concerning partnership affairs, "(A) [ilf he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or
possession of its property by his partners; (B) [ilf the right exists under the terms of any agreement;
[and/or] *** (D) [wlhenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable." See, also, R.C.
1775.42. The statutory law fails to mention "goodwill" in all but one section and that is R.C. 1775.37
which sets forth rights of partners in dissolution. Subsection (B)(3) of that provision specifically pro-
vides that a partner who has wrongfully caused a dissolution shall not have goodwill considered in the
determination of the value of his partnership interest.
Spaydat 59, 482 N.E.2d at 1236.
"Id. at 63, 482 N.E.2d at 1239.
1'd. at 64, 482 N.E.2d at 1240.
22Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436 11893). In this case, goodwill was found to at-
tach to the name of a newspaper. The court relied on the "continuity of name."
"This is a frequently quoted statement. See, e.g.. Snyder Mfg. Co. v. Snyder, 54 Ohio St. 86, 43 N.E. 325
1896): Norris and Cochran v. Howard, 41 Iowa 508, 511 (1875): Cruttwell v. Lyle, 17 Ves. 335 11788): Mat-
tis v. Lally, 138 Conn. 51, 54, 62 A.2d 155, 156 (1951): Jackson v. Caldwell. 18 Utah 2d 81, 85, 415 P.2d
667, 670 (1966): Engle v. Vernon, 215 N.W.2d 506, 513 (1974): J. StoRY. COMMEN I'gFIES ON tiI- LAW oF
PARTNERSHIP. § 99 (1868.
2 Lord Justice Cotten, writing in Cooper v. Metropolitan Board of Works L.R., 25 Ch.D. 472. 479 (18821.
"Quoted in Dugan v. Dugan. 92 N.J. 423, 429. 457 A.2d 1. 4 119831.
2 Goodwill was, in fact, valuable property. "A large portion of the intrinsic or assessable value of a business
consists of the goodwill maintained by it." Wilmer v. Thomas, 74 Md. 485, 22 A. 403 (1891).
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to an established business in a familiar location. 27 By 1902, the courts recog-
nized that the right to carry on an established business and to represent that it
was a continuation of that business was also a valuable asset, even when the
new business was not connected with the original real estate." While goodwill
was considered to be a valuable asset, it could not be disposed of independently
of an on-going business.29 Goodwill became an asset at the time a business was
sold, when the purchaser bought the right to carry on the business. Thus, by
the turn of the century, the chief elements of goodwill in a business partnership
were considered to be continuity of place and name.3
By defining goodwill as "continuity of place and name," it is more easily
understood why goodwill was viewed as an asset of a business partnership, and
not a professional partnership. A business has a familiar name and a familiar
place, but as Abraham Lincoln said, a lawyer has "time and advice." 1 This
reasoning prompted the court in Rice v. Angell 2 to hold that when a profes-
sional partnership ended, nothing of this "time" or "advice" would be left.33
"Upon the dissolution of the [insurance agency] each partner took with him his
chance of securing the patronage of the old firm, without any advantage over
the other, except such as was purely personal to himself."3 Since it was viewed
that goodwill attached to the personality and reputation of the individual part-
ners, there could be no separate "partnership goodwill" in a professional part-
nership." Several courts suggested that it might be fraud, or against public
policy, for a professional partnership to attempt to create an appearance of
continuity by preserving the personal goodwill of a former partner. 6
"Hart v. Smith, 159 Ind. 182, 64 N.E. 661, 662 (1902). The local goodwill generated by old customers re-
turning to the old place could inhere to real property and give it additional value.
2 ld.
2
'Metropolitan Bank. 149 U.S. at 446.
1'In re Anastos Estate, 45 Ohio Op. 91, 92, 100 N.E.2d 324, 326 (P. Ct. 1944). See also Brown. 242 N.Y. at
7. 150 N.E. at 583.
3
'Dwver 133 N.J. Super. at 346. 336 A.2d. at 499. See also Altman, 15Steps to Partnership. 10 BARRISTER
4. 601983). (In more modern terms, a lawyer's time and advice may consist of "communication. judgment,
interactional skills and managerial ability.").
1:73 Tex. 350, II S.W. 338 11889).
33Id.
• 1d. at 354, II S.W. at 340.
-"See. e.g.. Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d. 81, 86, 415 P.2d 667, 670 11966); Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App.
2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966): Cook v. Lauten, I Ill. App. 2d 255, 117 N.E.2d 414 (1954); Annot., 65
A.L.R. 521 (1959). In Hunt v. Street, 182 Tenn. 167, 184 S.W.2d 553 (1945) the goodwill of a partnership of
architects was held to be personal to the members of the firm, and thus had no value after the firm was
dissolved. A partnership of two engineers was found not to have measurable goodwill in Harstad v. Metcalf,
56 Wash. 2d 239, 351 P.2d 1037 11960) because each continued his own portion of the business after it was
dissolved. In Kalez v. Miller, 20 Wash. 2d 362, 147 P.2d 506 41944 four doctors dissolved their partnership.
The business of the old partnership was not continued, no old business contracts were renewed and three of
the former partners created a new partnership. Therefore, the court determined that there was no goodwill
to be distributed.
"Read v. Mackey, 47 Misc. 435, 95 N.Y.S. 935 (1905). The firm name of a business can become impersonal
because it indicates the quality of the article, not the personal attributes of the dealer, so it is not deceptive to
have a firm name continue. Weiner v. Weiner, 88 Misc. 2d 920, 924, 390 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (1976). Normal-
[Vol. 20:1
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In summing up the difference between business goodwill and professional
goodwill, it seems that courts viewed business goodwill as being reflected in a
firm's name, location or products. These elements could be measured and
valued with some specificity. The goodwill of a professional partnership was an
intangible reflection of confidence in the ability of a particular individual.37
This individual skill was inseparable from the person and could not exist or be
measured when the partnership dissolved.3"
The concept of goodwill as an asset began to expand as courts determined
that the definition of "old customers and old place" was too narrow. 9
The definition of goodwill was gradually broadened to include a "host of
intangibles."40 Goodwill came to include all of the special advantages that
related to a going concern. Therefore, goodwill encompassed the quality of
management, the nature and existence of competition, capable staff, high
credit standing, local position, common celebrity, reputation for skill and in-
fluence, affluence, punctuality, and even ancient prejudices and partialities.4 '
While the earlier, more narrow definition of goodwill seemed to exclude
professional partnerships, the broader definitions included intangibles, which
seemed to include many elements that are found in professional partnerships.
A professional partnership might not have a familiar location, but it should
have capable staff or qualified management. "Goodwill can also be founded
upon personal skill and reputation. The reputation for skill and learning in a
particular professional can win the confidence of the [former or future] clients
of a professional person." 2 As courts began to recognize that goodwill could
exist as a property right in a professional partnership, the value of intangibles
such as reputation and skill came to be viewed as triable questions of fact. 3
However, to be considered as a measurable asset, the experience and goodwill
of a professional partnership had to be capable of pecuniary estimation." For
example, in Evans v. Gunnip,3 the court considered whether a partnership of
ly, the name of a partnership is an element of its goodwill. But in some cases, it would be fraud on the public
to conserve the goodwill of a former partner, which is personal to him, by attempting to create an ap-
pearance of continuity.
"Smith v. Posner, 85 Misc. 2d. 934, 935-6, 380 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (1975).
3"Id.
"Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888).
"Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 430, 457 A.2d I, 5( 1983).
"See. e.g., Smith v. Bull, 50 Cal. 2d 294, 325 P.2d 463 (1958). A personal service organization such as an ad
agency may have goodwill, which results from the personal skill, talent, experience or reputation of the in-
dividuals connected with it. Dugan, 92 N.J. at 430, 457 A.2d at 4; Murray v. Bateman, 315 Mass. 113, 115,
51 N.E.2d 954, 956 (1943); Stefanski v. Gonnella, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 500, 502, 446 N.E.2d 734, 736 (1983).
1239 AM. JutR. 2d Goodwill § 8 (1968); Harstad v. Metcalf, 56 Wash. 2d 239, 315 P.2d. 1037 11960); Kalez v.
Miller, 20 Wash. 2d 362, 142 P.2d 506 (1944).
'4Berg v. Settle, 70 Wash. App. 864, 867, 425 P.2d 635, 638 11967). In Berg the facts of this case indicated
that the radiology practice in question had a substantial element of goodwill.
"Camden v. Stuart, 144 U.S. 104 (1892). ("Experience and goodwill can not be unsubstantial or shadowy.")
"136 D.Ch. 58, 76, 135 A.2d 128, 131 (1957).
RECENT CASESSummer, 19861
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certified public accountants had goodwill other than that which was personal
to each of the partners. The court considered that issue to be a question of fact
and considered testimony that most of the accounts were recurring, the part-
nership's files contained valuable history, clients remained with the firm for
long periods, and whether other partners who had retired had received
payments for goodwill."6 This evidence led the court to hold that goodwill had
attached to the professional partnership. 7 Similar evidence was considered by
the court in Fine v. Laband5 when a medical partnership ended. The court
phrased the issue, "Was there a goodwill of significance attributable to the cor-
poration separately and apart from the goodwill enjoyed by each of the physi-
cians separately?" 9 The evidence in the case indicated that when the tangible
partnership assets were divided, each physician took his own patient files and
continued to practice medicine in his own name." Each physician continued to
have a separate phone listing and continued to practice in the same building
that the partnership used." Patients continued to see the same physician who
had been treating them when the physicians were practicing as partners. 2 The
court determined, therefore, that the goodwill that existed flowed to each doc-
tor individually. 3 There was no partnership goodwill to be divided as an asset.5
However, courts in other jurisdictions found that goodwill could exist in pro-
fessional partnerships, including medicine, accounting and veterinary
medicine." Eventually, the leading medical association recognized goodwill as
an asset and provided informational pamphlets on the subject to physicians. 6
A. Goodwill in a Law Partnership
Although there was a developing trend to find measurable goodwill in
many professional partnerships, this trend did not extend to law partnerships.
This was due to the unique attorney-client relationship. As one court has ex-
pressed, "clients are not merchandise. They cannot be bought, sold or traded.
The attorney-client relationship is personal and confidential and the client's
choice of attorneys in civil cases is never absolute. The client always has the
option to substitute another attorney of his choice [Therefore any goodwill is
" Id. at 84, 135 A.2d at 131.
"Id. at 88, 135 A.2d at 133.
4135 Wash. App. 368, 667 P.2d 101 (1983).
111d. at 370, 667 P.2d 101-02.
ld. at 379, 667 P.2d at 107.




":See, e.g.. Cohen v. Biernoff, 84 A.D. 802, 444 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1981); Durio v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 82, 358
P.2d. 703 (1961).
"Smith v. Posner, 85 Misc. 2d 934, 936, 380 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199 (1975).
[Vol. 20:1
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 20 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/8
personal to the individual attorney]."5 In Lyon v. Lyon,5" the court reasoned
that "the personal and confidential relationship existing between each [lawyer]
and client places such a partnership in a class apart from other businesses and
professional partnerships." A client and his attorney are expected to have an
individual relationship, which is separate from any partnership. 9
This personal, individual relationship between an attorney and client, and
the goodwill that resulted, was the norm in the days of sole practitioners or
small law partnerships. However, courts began to reason that large law part-
nerships, with many departments, computerized files and billing systems and
impressive physical surroundings were becoming more common. Law partner-
ships were beginning to resemble other professional enterprises.6 As a result,
goodwill began to be recognized as an asset of a law firm in some instances.
"Goodwill is the ability of a particular law firm to attract clients either because
of the firm's name, firm's physical location or the reputation of the lawyers
employed by the firm and this goodwill may be ascertainable for certain pur-
poses.' Initially, goodwill was found to be a measurable asset in divorce prop-
erty divisions. 6 The goodwill of a law partnership was included as an asset in
divorce community property settlements, because after the divorce, the law
practice would continue with the same intangible value after the divorce.
These intangibles were the spouse's skill and reputation as an attorney.6 3
"Kohner v. Wales, 16 Wash. App. 304, 556 P.2d 233 (1976). This same reasoning was also reflected in a case
involving a medical partnership, Jones v. Fakehany, 261 Cal.2d 298, 306, 67 Cal. Rptr. 810, 815, in which
the court said, "The patient may not properly be regarded as the subject of 'ownership'. The practice of
medicine is a business, not a profession."
"246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 524, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (1966).
59 Id.
10See, e.g., Grayck, Compensation and Fringe Benefits. J. CORP. TAX'N 258 (1981). Law partners are being
encouraged to incorporate, so that they can reap the benefits of corporate retirement plan deductions, tax
and fiscal year calendars and pension and profit sharing plans. See Hildebrandt and Santangelo, Partnership
Compensation: Why Objective Formulas Don't Work, 10 LEGAL ECON. 39, 41 (Jan.-Feb. 1984):
All partners must understand that the distribution of profits in any law firm is an extremely difficult
task and that no one year should be viewed alone when the partner's worth to the firm is being
evaluated. When all is said and done, each partner should feel comfortable that those who are
"dividing the pie" have put forth reasonable and prudent efforts in the equitable distribution of the
firm's net profits. Such an approach requires a great deal of trust on the part of each partner, plus the
sacrifice of his or her ego. This trust and sacrifice is essential to the well-being of today's law firm.
A brief survey of law review journals shows that their table of contents frequently present articles on the
"business" aspects of a law practice, including, Upgrading Your Law Office Computer System, 71 A.B.A.J.
1, (1985); The Professional Corporationfor Lawyers. 87 CASE & CoM. 27 (Jan.-Feb. 1982); Critical Factors
in Acquiring a Computer, 58 FLA. B.J. 67 (1984). Advertisement for a sejninar on Marketing and Selling of
Legal Services, 19 GA. ST. B.J. 115 (1983); Improving Corporate Practice with a Staff Manual, 10 LEGAL
ECON. 3 (1984). This "business' trend can also be seen in the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT. Rule
5.1 and Rule 5.2 (Law Firms and Associations).
"Annot., 79 A.L.R. 3d 1244-49 (1977).
O2See, e.g.. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d. 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542,
397 A.2d 374 (1978); Fenton v. Fenton, 134 Cal. App. 3d 451, 184 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1982); Kaplan v. Kaplan,
23 Wash. App. 27, 592 P.2d 1124 (1979); Fleege v. Fleege, 91 Wash. App. 27, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). See
Swann v. Mitchell, 435 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1983). (The goodwill of a professional practice has also been found
to be property for which corporate stock could be issued.)
"Lopez v. Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 108, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58,67 (1974); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d
401, 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737 (1969). In Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d I 1(1983), a divorce pro-
ceeding, 70% of the value of the law practice consisted of the value placed on goodwill.
RECENT CASESSummer, 19861
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It was this "dramatic change" in the legal profession that caused the Ohio
Supreme Court to reconsider the status of goodwill in a law partnership. With
law partnerships becoming more "business-oriented," the court felt that good-
will should not be precluded as a matter of law."4 The court reasoned that if law
firms used computers, office managers, department heads and engaged in
mergers and cost-effectiveness planning, that goodwill was just another
"business-oriented" element." The majority held that "where the evidence
established that a professional partnership, including a law partnership, has
generated measurable goodwill, it is not against public policy to include that
amount of goodwill as an asset upon dissolution of the business"66 Chief Justice
Celebreeze, in his concurring opinion, agreed that the law firm in the instant
case had loyal clients who were attracted to the firm itself.67
The Spayd concurring opinion seemed to agree with the rationale in
Bump v'. Stewart, Wimer and Bump, P.C.68 That is, while the trend to include
goodwill as an asset of a law partnership can extend to certain circumstances,
such as divorce settlement valuations, it should not extend to the dissolution of
a law partnership.69 At first, this reasoning might appear to be contradictory. If
goodwill can be an asset in a law partnership in certain circumstances, why is it
not an asset all of the time? An examination of the ethical considerations that
are involved in a law partnership may offer an explanation.
B. Goodwill Under DR 2-107(B)
Courts must examine whether DR 2-107(B) of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility precludes finding the existence of goodwill in a law part-
nership upon its dissolution.
The rigid classification of goodwill into [business] and personal had
obscured the issue in many cases. The question is not: Is the goodwill per-
sonal? The solution of any controversy regarding goodwill seems to be
dependent upon two questions: 1) Does goodwill in fact exist? 2) May the
benefit of it, under the circumstances, be made available ... without fraud
upon the public?7 °
The Spayd court answered the first question in the affirmative and held that
measurable goodwill could exist in a law partnership. The court then turned to
"Spayd. 19 Ohio St. 3d at 62, 482 N.E.2d at 1238.
"id. at 61, 482 N.E.2d at 1238.
"Id. at 65, 482 N.E.2d at 1240.
" d. at 62, 482 N.E.2d at 1238 (Celebreeze, C.J., concurring).
"Bump v. Stewart, wimer and Bump, P.C., 336 N.W.2d. 731 (Iowa 1983). This case, on appeal, involved
problems generated by the separation of a lawyer (Bump) from a law firm operating as a professional cor-
poration. The trial court had refused to include an amount for goodwill in the corporation's value because
Bump had taken a substantial number of clients with him. The amount of their billings was more than his
share of the goodwill.
9Id.
7
'Laube, Goodwill in Professional Partnerships, CORNELL L.Q. 303, 326 (1927).
lVol. 20:1
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 20 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/8
the second question, which involved ethical considerations relevant to a law
partnership practice. These ethical considerations focus primarily on DR
2-107(B).7 Under this Disciplinary Rule, lawyers who are not partners or
associates are prohibited from dividing fees for legal services, unless the fee is
based upon a division of services or responsibility. 2
Case law set forth the principle that payment for goodwill violated DR
2-107(B) because distribution of goodwill at the time of a dissolution of a law
partnership was a payment based on future earnings." The partner who had
left the law firm would receive payments for goodwill based on the firm's repu-
tation to acquire future business. However, the departing partner would not
have performed any service or had any responsibility for the future clients. Ac-
cording to DR 2-107(B), this seemed to be an impermissive sharing of future
fees."
However, in Spayd, the Ohio Supreme Court felt that a closer look at DR
2-107(B) indicated that goodwill would not be precluded as an asset of a law
partnership upon dissolution." The majority reasoned that goodwill and future
earnings were not identical.76 This reasoning had been reflected in other
jurisdictions.77 In Dugan v. Dugan, 8 the court said that "future earning capaci-
ty per se is not goodwill."' 9 In Smith v. Bull,80 the court emphasized that the
"MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 Division of Fees Among Lawyers states:
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a partner in or
associate of his law firm or law office unless
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a divi-
sion of fees will be made
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by
each
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable compensation for all legal ser-
vices they rendered the client.
(B) This disciplinary Rule does not prohibit payment to a former partner or associate pursuant to a
separation or retirement agreement.
16 O.JUR. 3d Attorneys At Law § 455 (1979).
"Detroit Bank and Trust Co. v. Cooper, 93 Mich. App. 459, 287 N.W.2d 266 (1979). (Goodwill is the value
assigned to the expectation of future business.) Lopez v. Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 108, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58,
67 (1974). (The economic value of any asset depends upon the future net receipts which the asset will pro-
duce.)
1
4See, e.g.. In re Sheldon Silverberg, 75 A.D. 2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980); Siddall v. Keating, 8 A.D.2d
44, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1959). The New York court denied an allowance of goodwill to a retiring partner of a
law firm because such an asset would have been based upon the future earnings of the continuing law firm.
The retiring partner would have no active part or responsibility for the future earnings. Lyon v. Lyon, 246
Cal. App. 519, 526, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829, 833 (1966) (The plaintiff was ousted from a ten-member law firm and
an accounting of his one-tenth share did not include anything for goodwill).
"Spayd, 19 Ohio St. 3d at 63, 482 N.E.2d at 1239.
"6id. at 62, 482 N.E.2d at 1238.
"Freedman v. Freedman, 23 Wash. App. 27, 30, 592 P.2d 1124, 1126 (1979). (Goodwill is not synonymous
with the expectation of future earnings. Goodwill is measured by present value based upon past results.)
Aufmuth v. Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d. 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979). (The expectancy of future earnings is
not synonymous with, nor should it be the basis for determining the goodwill of a professional practice.)
792 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d I (1983).
"Id. at 433, 457 A.2d at 6.
1050 Cal. 2d 294, 325 P.2d 43 (1958).
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allowance for partnership goodwill was not based upon a share of the profits of
the new agency. Rather, the value was based upon the goodwill that the part-
nership possessed before its dissolution."'
Divorce property settlements provided further reasoning for the existence
of goodwill as a present, and not a future asset. In Foster v. Foster,5 the court
noted that the goodwill of a spouse's partnership was taken into consideration
in determining the other spouse's community property award. Since a com-
munity interest could only be acquired during the time of the marriage, the
value of any goodwill must have existed at the time the marriage ended. That
value must have been established without dependence on the potential or con-
tinuing net income of the professional spouse.83
This concept of goodwill existing as a present and measurable asset can be
further understood by examining the methods for computing goodwill. There
are methods for determining the value of goodwill when an actual sale of part-
nership property has not occurred, which measure goodwill based on the sale
price."' These methods include:
1. Capitalization of earnings; or
2. Subtracting the value of the tangible assets of a business from the
[estimated] sale price of that business.85
However, those two formulas do not necessarily reflect the goodwill
which is personal to some particular individual. Those elements of the goodwill
asset that are attributable to the personality, skill or business acumen of an in-
dividual partner can be evaluated by comparing the profit margin of a similar
firm where no such unusual personal elements of goodwill exist.86
Lopez v. Lopez87 involved determining the value of the goodwill of the
attorney-husband's law practice for a divorce community property settlement.
The Lopez court considered the practitioner's age, health, past demonstrated
earning power, professional reputation as to his judgment, skill and
knowledge, and the nature and duration of the practice, in assessing the value
of the partnership goodwill.8 The court in Aufmuth v. Aufmuth89 was faced
a.
"
2147 Cal. App. 2d 338, 305 P.2d. 152 (1956).
"Id. See also Fortier v. Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 384, 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915, 918 (1973).
"Swann v. Mitchell, 435 So. 2d. 797, 800-01 (Fla. 1983).
85Id.
Old. See, e.g., Dugan, 92 N.J. at 439, 457 A.2d at 6. Measurable goodwill can be determined by fixing the
amount by which a law partner's earnings exceed that which would have been earned by an employee with
similar qualifications of education, experience and capability. By determining what an attorney of com-
parable experience, expertise, education and age would be earning as an employee in the same locale, the dif-
ference can be attributed to the presence of the law partnership.
"38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974).
"Id. at 109-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
"89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (1979).
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with determining the value of a law partnership's goodwill for a divorce settle-
ment. The lawyer spouse in that case was thirty-one years old and had been a
member of the Bar for seven years and a member of the firm for five years. In
view of his "youth and comparative inexperience," both the trial court and the
appeals court concluded that he had not contributed in any substantial way to
whatever goodwill the firm might have possessed.9"
Thus, courts have been able to develop and use criteria for establishing a
present and measurable value of the goodwill attributable to a law partnership.
Therefore measurable goodwill can be distributed to the withdrawing law part-
ner without violating DR 2-107(B), if it exists at the time of the dissolution of
the law partnership. This is because the departing partner is entitled to all
tangible and intangible assets present at the time of dissolution. DR 2-107(B)
does allow payment to a former partner or associate pursuant to a separation
or retirement agreement.
The Spayd majority agreed that goodwill could be a present asset and did
not depend entirely on future earnings.9 Their reasoning follows naturally
from their holding on the first issue. If measurable goodwill is held to be an
asset upon the dissolution of a law partnership and if it can be measured at the
time of dissolution, then goodwill would not only be based on future earnings.
The departing partner merely receives a final accounting, which is allowed
under DR 2-107(B). He would not be involved in the impermissive sharing of
future fees, which is prohibited by DR 2-107(B). Thus, considering goodwill to
be a present and not a future asset removes the ethical roadblock. The Spayd
majority specifically held, "we conclude as a matter of law the ethical standard
within DR 2-107(B) does not preclude finding that goodwill exists in a law part-
nership upon dissolution of that association."9
Chief Justice Celebreeze, in his concurring opinion in Spayd did not agree
with this reasoning.93 Although he believed goodwill existed and was measur-
ld. See also Hildebrandt and Santangelo, Partnership Compensation: Why Objective Formulas Don't
Work, 10 LEGAL ECON. 39, 41 (1984). In determining measurable criteria for becoming a law firm partner all
contributions to the success of the firm are considered. This includes involvement in management as well as
handling legal matters. Criteria focus on client development, professional and charitable work, seniority,
loyalty, political activities and legal education. It would seem that these criteria would also contribute to the
goodwill of the partnership.
I'Spayd. 19 Ohio St. 3d at 62-63, 482 N.E.2d at 1239.
"Id. at 63, 482 N.E.2d at 1239. The Spayd majority also quoted Dugan with approval.
Though other elements may contribute to goodwill in the context of a professional service, such as
locality and specialization, reputation is at the core. *** It does not exist at the time professional
qualifications and a license to practice are obtained. A good reputation is earned after accomplish-
ment and performance. Field testing is an essential ingredient before goodwill comes into being.
Future earning capacity per se is not goodwill. However, when that future earning capacity has been
enhanced because reputation leads to probable future patronage from existing and potential clients,
goodwill may exist and have value. When that occurs the resulting goodwill is property subject to
equitable distribution.
Id (quoting Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 433, 457 A.2d 1, 6 (1983)).
"Spayd. 19 Ohio St. 3d at 65, 482 N.E.2d at 1239.
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able, he adopted a stricter division between what constituted a present pay-
ment and a future earning." ' Chief Justice Celebreeze allows a firm to gradual-
ly pay off a retiring partner's tangible assets in the partnership, or to provide a
retiring partner with reasonable retirement payments. 5 These payments could
be made with the ethical approval of DR 2-107(B) because the values could be
determined at the time the partner left and the Disciplinary Rule allows for
such payments to partners." However, Chief Justice Celebreeze reasoned that
it is against public policy to permit "a former partner to receive a portion of
future services rendered by the firm in settlement of goodwill." 7
The differences in reasoning between the Spayd majority and concurring
opinions focused on the issue of goodwill as a present or future asset. The bet-
ter argument lies with the majority in Spayd. Both opinions agree that giving
retiring partners gradual payments for tangible assets or reasonable retirement
payments is acceptable under DR 2-107(B). There is little difference between
those payments and payments for goodwill upon dissolution. All of those pay-
ment amounts could be determined at the time of the partnership dissolution,
although the actual payments to the withdrawing partner might have to come
from the firm's future earnings. Therefore, payment for an asset that is deter-
minable in the present, such as goodwill, should not be precluded by DR
2-107(B).
11. NECESSITY OF A SPECIFIC CONTRACTUAL PROVISION FOR GOODWILL AS A
DISTRIBUTABLE ASSET
Although Plaintiff-Spayd prevailed on the goodwill issues, he won only a
moral victory. The court agreed with him that measurable goodwill could be
an asset upon the dissolution of the business and that ethical considerations did
not prevent the distribution of goodwill. However, the court also held that
"provision for goodwill as an asset of a partnership which is to be distributed
upon the dissolution of a business is a matter of contract between the partners
and must be specifically set forth in the partnership agreement."98 The partner-
ship agreement that Spayd had with the law firm did not provide for the pay-
ment of goodwill, the accounting practice of the law firm did not include good-
will as an asset, nor had any previously retiring partner received a payment for




"Id. The concurring opinion found support for its reasoning in Siddall v. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185
N.Y.S.2d 630 (1959l, aljfd 7 N.Y.2d 846, 196 N.Y.S.2d 986 11959), which expressed policy and ethical con-
cerns about distributable goodwill. The concurring opinion also looked to Bump v. Stewart, Wimer and
Bump, P.C., 336 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Iowa 19831. "Placing a price tag on the goodwill of a law practice is con-
trary to public policy."
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of a partnership which is to be distributed upon the dissolution of the business
is a matter of contract which must be assented to by all parties involved."
Therefore, Spayd did not receive payment for his share of the goodwill because
the distribution of goodwill had not been specifically provided for in the part-
nership agreement and a provision for payments could not be implied from the
partnership's conduct.
This holding is at odds with the accepted practice in business partnerships
and may still be an area where professional and business partnerships differ. In
business partnerships "ordinarily, goodwill is an asset of the partnership and is
included in an accounting upon the dissolution or termination of the partner-
ship agreement."'' "Indeed the statement that goodwill must be included in
the accounting if it is an asset of the partnership is lalmost redundant] since, of
course, all assets having any value must be accounted for."'1
0 2
Standard business practice is also contrary to the Spayd holding. "The
goodwill of a partnership engaged in trading, manufacturing or publishing is
an asset of the firm which must be accounted for upon dissolution of the firm...
in the absence of any agreement to the contrary."' 3 The partnership agree-
ment may specifically provide that goodwill shall not be taken into account on
a dissolution in order for it to be excluded as an asset.34 Practically speaking,
since accounting for goodwill is the rule in business partnerships, "the goodwill
of a partnership should be converted into cash in the most advantageous way,"
so as to produce the largest sum for all parties interested.' 5
While the Spayd court allowed goodwill to be distributed if a payment
agreement was specifically provided for in the partnership agreement, business
partnerships allow goodwill to be distributed unless prohibited by the partner-
ship agreement. There are two circumstances which may prohibit the distribu-
tion of goodwill as an asset in business partnerships. These will be presented to
show two alternative bases for the Spayd court's decision.
First, goodwill will not be considered in an accounting between partners
where the dissolution was caused by the wrongful act of one of the partners.'16
This appears to be the majority rule and is reflected in Ohio Revised Code §
1775.37(B)(3), which states that a partner who has caused the dissolution
"'Id
"
""60 AM. JUR. 2d Partnership § 282 J1972).
"
2Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 523 (1959). ("The fruitful inquiry is, rather, when can it be said that the partnership
does or does not have such an asset.")
"113 0. JUR. 3d. Business Relationships § 955 (1979); See, e.g., Wolf v. Murrane, 199 N.W.2d 92, 100 (Iowa,
1972); Whitman v. Jones, 322 Mass. 340, 343, 77 N.E.2d 315, 317(1948). ("In the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, the partner appropriating the firm's goodwill to his own use must account for its value.")
"Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 524 (1959).
10168 C.J.S. Partnership § 395 (1950).
1 60 AM- JUR. 2d Partnership § 282 (1972).
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wrongfully shall not receive the value of the goodwill of the business.'"7 The
Uniform Partnership Act specifies sanctions for wrongfully causing a dissolu-
tion which include denial of goodwill.' 8 However, this denial of goodwill to the
"wrong" partner appears to be losing favor because it currently seems to serve
no compensatory or punitive function."° The partnership in Spayd was dis-
solved through a voluntary departure of one of the partners." 0 Therefore, the
rule denying goodwill to the partner who wrongfully caused the dissolution
would not have applied. However, this rule is being applied on a less frequent
basis. If even "wrongful" partners can receive their share of the partnership
goodwill, it would seem that a partner, like Spayd, should be entitled to pay-
ment for goodwill.
Goodwill is also denied to a partner who has already received the benefit
of his interest in the goodwill."' Therefore, a partner who has taken some of
the firm's business with him may already have received compensation for his
share of the goodwill. Spayd did succeed in taking one client of the partnership
with him when he left the firm."' Perhaps the Spayd court should have denied
'"Otmto Riv. (ot ANN. § 1775.37 (Baldwin Supp. 1979).
(31 A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have:
(a) If the business is not continued under division IB)12) of this section all the rights of a part-
ner under division IA). subject to division IB)IlI)lb) of the section:
IN If the business is continued under division B)2) of this section the right as against his partners
and all claiming through them in respect of their interests in the partnership, to have the value
of this interest in the partnership, less any damages caused to his partners by the dissolution,
ascertained and paid to him in cash. or the payment secured by bond approved by the court,
and to be released from all existing liabilities of the partnership, but in ascertaining the value
of the partner's interest the value of the goodwill of the business shall not be considered.
'"The liquidation provision of § 38111 is not applicable when dissolution is caused 'in contravention of
the partnership agreement'. Section 3812) outlines the consequences of a dissolution caused in con-
travention of the partnership agreement:
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have:
1. If the business is not continued under the provisions of paragraph 12b) all the rights of a part-
ner under paragraph ( I). subject to clause )2all) of this section.
II. If the business is continued under paragraph 12b) of this section the right as against his co-
partners and all claiming through them in respect of their interests in the partnership, to have
the value of his interest in the partnership, less any damages caused to his co-partners by the
dissolution, ascertained and paid to him in cash, or the payment secured by bond approved by
the court, and to be released from all existing liabilities of the partnership; but in ascertaining
the value of the partner's interest the value of the goodwill of the business shall not be con-
sidered.
See Hillman, Partnership Misconduct. 78 Nw U.L. Rtv 527, 535 (1983): Bonner, When Law Partnerships
Dissolve. 5 CiAtIiF. LAW 15, 62 (19851. (In California, the partner who causes the wrongful dissolution has no
right to a share of any partnership goodwill.)
The UPA directive to disregard goodwill may be based on the perceived difficulties of valuation. At
its best, goodwill is nebulous. The drafters of the UPA may have been attempting through this
'forfeiture' to prevent the assertion of inflated claims based upon such a vague concept as goodwill. In-
deed, their concern in this regard was substantiated by the state of accounting practices at the turn of
the century. The automatic forfeiture of this partnership asset currently serves no useful purpose.
Hillman, supra note 108, at 535.
"Spa-d, 19 Ohio St. 3d at 64, 482 N.E.2d at 1239.
"'Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 521, 527 11959).
" Spayd. 19 Ohio St. 3d at 57, 482 N.E.2d at 1235. The client, Third National Bank, voted to have both the
plaintiff and the firm conduct a portion of their legal work.
[Vol. 20:1
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Spayd the goodwill payment because he had already received the benefit of his
interest in the goodwill. Denying the goodwill payment for this reason would
have been more in line with standard business procedure. But the Spayd court
gave as its reason for requiring a prior agreement the fact that "the respective
rights of partnership members depend primarily on the specific provisions con-
tained within the partnership contract."" 3 The court found support for this in
Siddall v. Keating."" The Siddall court denied payment of goodwill in a law
partnership dissolution. The court found that the written partnership agree-
ment it was considering had no provision for a distribution based on
goodwill."5 Goodwill was never reflected as an asset in the partnership ac-
counts and retiring partners had never received any payment for partnership
goodwill." 6 A contract for goodwill was not express and could not be implied.
Similar factors were present in Spayd. The written partnership agreement
specified the amount that was to be paid to a retiring or terminating partner,
but did not include a provision for goodwill. Goodwill was not carried as an
asset in the accounting practice and there was no evidence that goodwill
payments had been made to any previously retiring partner."7
The Spayd requirement of a specific provision in the partnership agree-
ment for the distribution of goodwill is a rigid rule that is not frequently fol-
lowed. In Engel v. Vernon, "8 the court first looked to the partnership agree-
ment covering the relation of the parties because it was a contract between
them." 9 However, when the Engel court felt that a "clear solution" was not ap-
parent in the partnership agreement, the court looked to general principles of
partnership law to decide the case. 20 The Engel court seems to have adopted a
more flexible approach by looking beyond the partnership agreement to
general principles of law.'2'
Support for the Spayd holding may come from DR 2-107(B) which per-
mits retiring partners to be paid pursuant to a prior agreement. Otherwise, it
would seem that the case law involving partnerships would not require the
rigid rule of allowing payments for goodwill to be made only when specified in
the partnership agreement.
"1d. at 64, 482 N.E.2d at 1240.
"8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1959), affd 196 N.Y.S.2d 986 11959).
" Id. at 47, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
"'Id. See also Cook v. Lauten, I Ill. App. 255, 258, 117 N.E.2d 414, 416 (1954). A CPA partnership had no
goodwill to be accounted for as an asset, where as here, there is no provision in the partnership agreement
relating to goodwill as an asset.
.. Spayd, 19 Ohio St. 3d at 64, 482 N.E.2d at 1240.
"1215 N.W. 506 (Iowa 1974).
"'Id. at 513.
"Id. See also In re Brown, 242 N.Y. I, 150 N.E. 581, 582 (1926) where the court considered the "course of
dealing" in addition to partnership law.
"'See, e.g., Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966) where the court considered whether
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Perhaps provisions for the distribution of goodwill should be included in
law partnership agreements since goodwill is not perceived as an intangible
asset of a law firm. If measurable goodwill becomes more common as an asset
of law firms, as it is in business firms, then a specific contractual provision for
goodwill payments may no longer be necessary.
111. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AFTER SPA YD
The court's decision in Spayd will probably have some practical effect on
law partnerships in Ohio. Law firms must develop formulas for measuring
goodwill. Law partners must provide for the distribution of goodwill in their
partnership agreements. However, the Spayd holding, which permits
measurable goodwill to be an asset upon the dissolution of a law partnership,
will probably have the most impact on larger law firms. "Small firms generally
have little if any goodwill in the firm's name."'22 In small firms, "attorney-
client relationships often are quite personal and not easily transferable."' 2 3
Permitting measurable goodwill to be a distributable asset of a law part-
nership is a concept of law that has emerged gradually. Other jurisdictions
have gone one step further and have started to consider whether goodwill can
be a saleable asset in the law practice of a sole practioner or partnership. 24 The
Spayd court specifically stated that they had not reached the issue of selling
goodwill.'25
The selling of a practice, including selling goodwill, brings more sharply
into play ethical considerations. Ethics committees' opinions have rejected
goodwill as a saleable asset of a law firm.'26 The sale of goodwill was considered
in Geffen v. Moss. 27 The California court determined that the sale of goodwill
was unethical because attorneys were prohibited from compensating another
'
22Bonner, supra note 108, at 62.
'11d. ("And, trying to put a number on goodwill in a [small] personal service [firm] is like trying to nail a rain-
drop to a wall.")
'Stewart, The Sale of a Law Practice, 19 PRAC. LAW. 63 (1975). ("In California, professional practice
brokers have become more common and are used to arrange the purchase or sale of a law firm.") Martin,
Selling the Goodwill of a Law Practice, 2 CALIF. LAW. 30, 32 (1982). (The California Bar Association has
recommended allowing the sale of goodwill if provisions are followed so that clients are protected.)
'
2 Spayd. 19 Ohio St. 3d at 59, 482 N.E.2d at 1236.
'
2 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 300 (196 1); Association of the
Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 633 (1943), reprinted in OPINIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION (1956). Committee on Professional Ethics of the New
York County Lawyers' Association in Op. 109 (1943): "Clients are not merchandise. Lawyers are not
tradesmen. They have nothing to sell but personal service. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients, would
appear to be inconsistent with the best concepts of our professional status." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A) has been interpreted to allow "payments to a retired partner or for a fixed
period to the estate of a deceased partner in accordance with a pre-existing retirement plan, the amount of
those payments being measured by subsequent earnings of the firm." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 327 (1971).
2753 Cal. App. 3d 215, 125 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1975).
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RECENT CASES
person for either soliciting or obtaining business."'
The commentators have pointed out that by selling goodwill, an attorney
would be compensated for transferring his clients' loyalties.2' Selling goodwill
that has been generated through client loyalty could also be seen as violating
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because it does not provide
clients with the maximum opportunity to choose their own legal counsel." 0
Although the Spaydcourt did not consider the ethics of selling goodwill, it
seems that this might be the next issue in the area of goodwill in a law partner-
ship that Ohio courts must confront, since other jurisdictions, such as Califor-
nia, are beginning to consider this issue. In Ohio, if goodwill can be measured
and ethically distributed upon dissolution of a law partnership, law firms may
feel encouraged to take the next step and attempt to sell all their partnership
assets, including goodwill.
CONCLUSION
"Goodwill is a very flexible and intangible thing. It seems that the more
research is made, the more confused one's mind becomes."'' This seems
especially true in cases such as Spayd, where the court followed the modern
trend and departed from the black and white rule which flatly prohibited good-
will as an asset in a law partnership.' Law partnerships seem to have come of
age in the modern business world. At this point, the Ohio Supreme Court is
allowing the existence of measurable goodwill to be determined as a question
of fact.'33 Ethical considerations, primarily DR 2-107(B), were held not to pro-
hibit goodwill as a distributable asset in the dissolution of a law partnership, if
provided for in the partnership agreement. 3
Other issues and considerations are raised by this decision. Many legal
professionals may still feel that the rule about goodwill in a law partnership
should not have been changed because the ethical considerations still apply to
prohibit goodwill. Legal practitioners will have to become more business-
oriented and begin to include provisions for goodwill in their partnership
agreements. Future cases may consider the existence of goodwill in the sale of
a law partnership, or solo practice, and whether goodwill must be mentioned in
'id. at 226, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 692. The attempted purchase of a law firm's goodwill includes the expectation
of future patronage from former and current clients, but the attorney-client relationship is personal and con-
fidential.
' .See Detroit Bank and Trust Co. v. Coopes, 93 Mich. App. 459, 463, 287 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1979) The sale
of goodwill would result in increased fees charged to clients in order to compensate the attorney for his pur-
chase of that commodity. Clients can not be sold to the highest bidder.
'"MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2: "A lawyer should assist the legal professional in
fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available."
"'In re Anastos' Estate, 45 Ohio Op. 91, 92, 100 N.E.2d 324, 326 (P. Ct. 1944).
"'See Rice v. Angell, 73 Tex. 350, 354, II S.W. 338, 340 (1889).
'"Spayd. 19 Ohio St. 3d at 62, 482 N.E.2d at 1238.
"4ld. at 63, 482 N.E.2d at 1239.
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professional partnership agreements.
The future will tell if the Spayd decision was just "one step forward in
contract law and two steps backward in the realms of legal ethics and public
policy." ,
JEAN HOFFMAN
"1d. at 66, 482 N.E.2d at 1238 (Celebrezze, C.J. concurring).
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